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RX FOR COSTLY CREDIT: DEFERRED 
INTEREST MEDICAL CREDIT CARDS DO 
MORE HARM THAN GOOD 
ALLISON J. ZIMMON* 
Abstract: Various health care providers offer patients medical credit cards that 
charge high rates of deferred interest. As the cost of medical care and patient re-
sponsibility for out-of-pocket costs continue to rise, patients have turned to med-
ical credit cards for help footing the bill. Unfortunately, because they fail to pay 
off their balances before the end of the promotional period, many patients find 
themselves unexpectedly responsible for deferred interest charges at rates well 
above those associated with general-purpose credit cards. Medical credit cards 
fall outside the protection of many federal credit laws regulating consumer credit. 
This Note argues that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) should 
ban deferred interest medical credit cards through the exercise of its rulemaking 
power. Short of a total ban on deferred interest medical credit cards, the CFPB 
should use its rulemaking power to expand the reforms it recently levied on GE 
CareCredit to the entire medical credit card industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
Sixty-eight-year-old Alice Diltz, a part-time hospital aide, needed five 
dental implants.1 The Hillside Dental Care clinic in Queens, New York quoted 
her a price of $7450 in October 2005.2 Diltz’s insurance would only pay $200 
towards the bill.3 Diltz and her retired husband lived on $18,000 each year 
from her part-time job and social security benefits.4 Diltz managed to pay $250 
up front for her implants, and signed up for what she thought was a payment 
plan administered by the clinic.5 Instead, Diltz had signed an application for a 
GE CareCredit deferred interest medical credit card.6 Although the paper was 
                                                                                                                           
 * Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE 2014–2015. 
 1 Brian Grow & Robert Berner, Fresh Pain for the Uninsured, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Nov. 21, 
2007), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/296038-fresh-pain-for-the-uninsured?type=old_
article. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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labeled as a credit card application, the print was so small that Diltz never saw 
it.7 Clinic employees never told her she was applying for a credit card.8 
After having her teeth pulled in preparation for the implants, Diltz experi-
enced heavy bleeding.9 Frightened, she left the office and cancelled the im-
plants four days later.10 To her surprise, she received a $7000 bill from GE 
CareCredit several weeks later.11 Even though Diltz’s implants were never 
completed, GE CareCredit had paid the dental clinic upfront, and wanted to be 
repaid.12 The bills kept arriving from GE CareCredit, even after Diltz disputed 
the charge.13 As interest accrued, her debt grew to over $10,000.14 GE 
CareCredit sued Diltz in state court to recover what it claimed she owed.15 On-
ly after BusinessWeek, a major national publication, inquired into her case did 
GE CareCredit agree to forgive Diltz’s debt and remove it from her credit re-
port.16 
Diltz’s medical credit card experience is replicated in medical, dental, 
ophthalmology, and audiology clinics across the country.17 Patients who can-
not afford necessary treatment are steered by office staff toward deferred inter-
est medical credit cards available right in their health care providers’ offices.18 
Often, patients do not realize that they are applying for a credit card.19 Even if 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. When Diltz did not pay the first bill she received, her 0% interest rate jumped immediately 
to 26.99% annually; consequently, her balance quickly grew from $7000 to over $10,000. Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Patients Mired in Costly Credit from Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2013, at A1. 
 18 See Jim Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers: Evidence from Fertility Markets, 84 TUL. L. REV. 841, 
859 (2010) (explaining that deferred interest medical credit card purveyors supply medical providers 
with promotional materials and train medical staff in sales techniques designed to entice patients into 
applying for credit); Lauren Horwitz, Note, Medical Credit Cards: A Clash Between Physicians’ In-
terests and Patients’ Rights, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV 807, 808 (2009) (noting that “[t]he dentist’s office 
manager can even help [patients] contact the credit card company, submit the application, and recom-
mend repayment options”); Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17 (describing the “growing number of 
health care professionals [that] are urging patients to pay for treatment not covered by their insurance 
plans with credit cards and lines of credits that can be arranged quickly in the provider’s office”). 
 19 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 877–78. “In some cases, the description of credit is so vague 
that patients do not even know they are signing up for credit at all . . . . [They] thought they were 
signing up for a payment plan with their doctors, but in actuality were applying for credit from third-
party lenders.” Id. at 878; see also Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17 (describing an elderly patient who 
did not realize he signed up for a GE CareCredit card during a dental visit); Kelly Dilworth, Medical 
Credit Cards: Treatment Today, Payment Headaches Tomorrow, FOX BUS. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://
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they do understand what they are applying for, patients are often not sufficient-
ly informed about the terms and conditions of the cards.20 Specifically, they 
are frequently unaware that the full cost of their treatment will be charged to 
the card up front or that they will be responsible for interest charges going 
back to the first day of treatment if their entire balance is not paid in full before 
the end of the promotional “no interest” period.21 Interest rates of up to thirty 
percent may then attach to patients’ balances; before they realize the gravity of 
the commitment, these patients are in significant debt with little hope of being 
able to repay what is owed.22 
Deferred interest medical credit cards were first introduced to the market-
place in the early 2000s as a way to finance elective and often cosmetic sur-
gery.23 Yet, as patients’ out-of-pocket medical expenses for non-elective medi-
cal care skyrocketed, deferred interest medical credit cards were marketed to 
patients and medical providers alike as an easy solution to these out-of-control 
costs.24 As of 2014, more than four million patients used medical credit 
cards.25 The cards are most often used to finance dental care but increasingly 
                                                                                                                           
www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2013/03/21/medical-credit-cards-treatment-today-payment-
headaches-tomorrow/ (stating that “some consumers may not even realize that they’re taking out a 
loan from a third party and may assume that it’s their doctor’s office that’s offering the loan”). 
 20 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 877–79 (describing how doctors recommend lenders to patients 
without ever discussing the terms of the credit offer); Horwitz, supra note 18, at 813–14 (describing 
the promotional literature provided by the medical credit card providers as “general and incomplete”); 
Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17 (describing findings by New York Attorney General’s Office that 
patients who applied for GE CareCredit cards were “misled about the terms of the credit cards”). 
Many patients report that they “don’t realize their debts are being shifted to . . . interest-charging mid-
dlemen[,]” and instead believe that the financing is being provided directly by their physician. Grow 
& Berner, supra note 1. 
 21 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 877–80; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 815–16; Silver-Greenberg, 
supra note 17; Grow & Berner, supra note 1. 
 22 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, supra note 19; Helaine Olen, The Medical 
Credit Card Trap, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 15, 2007, http://prospect.org/article/medical-credit-card-trap. 
 23 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Mary Pat Whaley, Using Medical Credit Cards: The 
Ugly, the Bad and the Good, MANAGE MY PRAC. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://managemypractice.com/
using-medical-credit-cards-the-ugly-the-bad-and-the-good. 
 24 See Overdose of Debt, CONSUMER REPS., July 2008, at 14, 15. According to the Federal Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), out-of-pocket medical payments will rise from $269 
billion in 2007 to $464 billion by 2017. Id. Older Americans who rely on Medicare or private insur-
ance plans that do not always cover their basic health care needs are heavy users of the cards. Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 17; see also Grow & Berner, supra note 1 (“The pool of self-pay patients is 
mammoth: Some are among the nation’s 47 million uninsured; others are among the 16 million whose 
plans offer scant coverage or have deductibles as high as $10,000.”). 
 25 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-570, CREDIT CARDS DESIGNED FOR MEDICAL 
SERVICES NOT COVERED BY INSURANCE 1 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/
664244.pdf. 
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are being used to pay health insurance deductibles or to pay for medical care 
by individuals who lack health insurance entirely.26 
As the use of medical credit cards rose, complaints began to pour into 
state attorneys general offices and, following its creation, into the federal Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).27 Patients complained that they 
were misled during the enrollment process into believing that the cards were 
interest-free.28 In addition, patients reported that they never received written 
copies of the credit card agreements and instead had to rely upon medical of-
fice staff’s oral representations of the cards’ terms.29 
In late 2013, the CFPB ordered GE CareCredit, the largest provider of 
medical credit cards, to change the way its cards were marketed and distribut-
ed.30 In addition, GE CareCredit was ordered to make a restitution payment of 
over thirty-four million dollars to consumers who unexpectedly incurred inter-
est charges.31 Currently, these reforms apply only to GE CareCredit; it is un-
clear how, if at all, they may be applied to the industry as a whole.32 
Part I of this Note describes patients’ increasing reliance on credit cards 
to pay for health expenses. It also explains the rise of the deferred interest 
medical credit card industry and the terms and conditions associated with the 
cards. Part II discusses the legal landscape supporting the rise of medical credit 
card usage, reforms within the credit card industry, and the creation of the con-
sumer-focused CFPB. Additionally, Part II examines the reforms required by 
the Consent Order imposed by the CFPB on the medical credit card company 
GE CareCredit. Part III argues that deferred interest medical credit cards 
should be banned through CFPB rulemaking. It further argues that in the ab-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. at 2–3, 7. 
 27 See Michelle Andrews, Be Skeptical of Health-Care Credit Cards, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 
2010, at E4; Blake Ellis, GE Capital to Pay $34 Million to Credit Card Customers, CNN MONEY, 
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/10/pf/ge-capital-credit-card-refund/; Press Release, 
Consumer Fin. Bureau, CFPB Orders GE CareCredit to Refund $34.1 Million for Deceptive Health-
Care Credit Card Enrollment (Dec. 10, 2013) [hereinafter CFPB Orders GE], available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders-ge-carecredit-to-refund-34-1-million-for-
deceptive-health-care-credit-card-enrollment/; Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneider-
man Announces Agreement with GE Capital Retail Bank and CareCredit LLC, Stopping High-
Pressure Tactics in Health Credit Card Sales to Consumers (June 3, 2013), available at http://
www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-agreement-ge-capital-retail-bank-and-
carecredit-llc-stopping. 
 28 See Andrews, supra note 27; Ellis, supra note 27; CFPB Orders GE, supra note 27. 
 29 See Andrews, supra note 27; Ellis, supra note 27; CFPB Orders GE, supra note 27. 
 30 See GE Capital Retail Bank, CareCredit LLC, File No. 2013-CFPB-0009, at 1 (CFPB Dec. 10, 
2013) (consent order) [hereinafter Consent Order]; CFPB Orders GE, supra note 27. 
 31 Consent Order, supra note 30, at 7; CFPB Orders GE, supra note 27. 
 32 See Consent Order, supra note 30; see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymak-
ing Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386 (2004) (explaining that an agency can choose whether or not 
to engage in rulemaking, adjudication, or guidance and select the parties that will be impacted by its 
actions). 
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sence of a ban, current federal credit law must be amended. Lastly, Part III en-
courages the CFPB to educate physicians and medical providers about the fi-
nancial products they offer to their patients. 
I. PATIENTS AND PHYSICIANS LOOK FOR HELP IN THE FACE OF RISING  
OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS 
The cost of medical care in the United States has risen steadily since the 
1970s.33 Over time, patients have assumed responsibility for a larger share of 
their health care costs.34 Patients and health care providers, while searching for 
ways to finance patients’ out-of-pocket expenses, have turned to medical credit 
cards for assistance.35 The majority of medical credit cards are offered on a 
deferred interest basis.36 If a patient is able to pay off the balance before the 
end of the promotional period, the patient can avoid interest charges.37 Patients 
who are unable to pay off their entire balance before the end of the deferred 
interest promotional period often find themselves unexpectedly on the hook for 
high interest charged retroactively for the entire bill, regardless of the amount 
of the balance that the patient has already paid.38 
A. Medical Expenses Lead to Mounting Debt 
Since Blue Cross and Blue Shield introduced health insurance in the first 
half of the twentieth century, the American health care landscape has been in 
flux.39 As the system continues to evolve, one thing remains constant: both 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See generally SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
199–205, 218–40 (2d ed. 2012). 
 34 Mitch Patridge & Doug Barry, Compassionate Patient Financing Can Cure a Hospital’s Fi-
nancial Ills, 32(4) J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 88, 88–90 (2006); Alyssa Brown, Costs Still Keep 30% of 
Americans from Getting Treatment, GALLUP (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/166178/
costs-keep-americans-getting-treatment.aspx?version=print; Olen, supra note 22; Silver-Greenberg, 
supra note 17; Amy Taub & Catherine Ruetschlin, The Plastic Safety Net: Findings From the 2012 
National Survey on Credit Card Debt of Low-and Middle-Income Households, DEMOS 15–16, http://
www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/PlasticSafetyNet-Demos.pdf. 
 35 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Whaley, supra note 23. 
 36 See Consent Order, supra note 30, at 3; Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16; Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 37 See Dilworth, supra note 19; Olen, supra note 22; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 38 See Dilworth, supra note 19; Olen, supra note 22; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 39 See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 33, at 199. Hospitals and physicians established state-
based, nonprofit corporations to sell health insurance plans open to all. Id. Hospitals created Blue 
Cross and physicians created Blue Shield. Id. Physicians and hospitals set the prices to be paid by 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield on behalf of patients. Id. After World War II, employment-based health 
insurance rose in prominence, and in 1965, Medicare and Medicaid were established to provide gov-
ernment-sponsored health insurance for the elderly and poor. Id. at 200, 202. The passage of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) ushered in more changes to the health care 
insurance and delivery system, and those changes continue to be implemented. Id. at 218–40; see also 
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insured and uninsured patients are responsible for a substantial portion of out-
of-pocket health care costs.40 Rising premiums and deductibles, coupled with 
reduced levels of coverage, require patients to reach deeper into their pockets 
to self-fund the care that they need.41 Out-of-pocket health care spending 
amounted to just over $300 billion in 2011.42 Despite the increase in the num-
ber of Americans who will receive health insurance coverage in the coming 
years through the reforms made by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), out-of-pocket health care spending is projected to rise to just under 
$450 billion annually by 2021.43 Patients are currently responsible for between 
                                                                                                                           
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 40 National Health Expenditures Projections 2011–2021, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/
NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/Proj2011PDF.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
 41 Partridge & Barry, supra note 34, at 88–90; Brown, supra note 34; Olen, supra note 22; Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 17; Taub & Ruetschlin, supra note 34, at 15. 
 42 National Health Expenditures Projections 2011–2021, supra note 40. 
 43 Id.; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-28, 
18001–18121 (2012). The ACA enacts several reforms that should make health care more affordable and 
accessible for many Americans. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-28, 18001–18121; Karen Pollitz, et al., 
Medical Debt Among People with Health Insurance, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 19 (2014) 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/8537-medical-debt-among-people-with-
health-insurance.pdf. Health insurance providers under the ACA are no longer allowed to reject people 
with pre-existing conditions and dependents will be covered under their parents’ plans until age twenty-
six. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-28, 18001–18121. The ACA also requires that certain insurance plans 
cover ten categories of essential health benefits (EHBs), which, while determined on a state-by-state 
basis, will include hospitalization, ambulatory care, rehabilitative and habilitative services, mental health 
care, and prescription drugs. Id. The ACA will also require health insurance plans to remove annual dol-
lar limits on covered benefits. Id.  
 In addition to making patient-friendly changes to health insurance plans, the ACA also revises the 
tax code in ways that may reduce some patients’ medical debt. 26 U.S.C. § 501(r) (2012). The revisions 
require non-profit hospitals to conduct community health needs assessments (CHNAs) every three years 
and make their plans to address those needs public, with hospitals that fail to meet their CHNA require-
ments subject to an annual $50,000 tax. Id. §§ 501(r)(3), 4959. The new revisions also require hospitals 
to establish financial assistance policies that are widely publicized in the community served by the hospi-
tal. Id. § 501(r)(4)(A). Hospitals must also commit to providing emergency care without discriminating 
against patients eligible for financial assistance. Id. § 501(r)(4)(B). Hospitals will also no longer be al-
lowed to charge patients who are eligible for financial assistance more than what they would charge a 
health insurance provider for the same care. Id. § 501(r)(5). 
 The ACA depends on individual states expanding their Medicaid programs to extend coverage to all 
low-income non-elderly adults with family incomes below 138% of the federal poverty line. How Will 
the Uninsured Fare Under the Affordable Care Act?, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/8531-how-will-the-uninsured-fare-under-
the-aca.pdf. As of August 28, 2014, only twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have expand-
ed their Medicaid programs. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-
around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/. Twenty-one states have refused to expand 
their programs and two states are actively debating whether to participate. Id. In states that fail to expand 
their Medicaid programs, non-elderly, low-income adults will continue to lack insurance coverage 
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twenty and thirty-five percent of every dollar of health care services they re-
ceive.44 
The rise of out-of-pocket medical costs has occurred alongside an explo-
sion of the credit card industry.45 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 156 
million Americans held credit cards in 2009.46 Thirty percent of Americans pay 
only the minimum monthly balance due on their credit cards.47 In 2012, the 
average credit card debt among low- and middle-income households was just 
over seven thousand dollars.48 In 2012, forty percent of low- and middle-
income families used credit cards to pay for basic living expenses, including 
housing, food, and utilities.49 Credit card use is high across all age brackets, 
but Americans age sixty-five and older carry the highest average balance: over 
nine thousand dollars.50 
Unsurprisingly, patients often resort to using their general-purpose credit 
cards to pay for out-of-pocket medical expenses.51 In 2010, Americans charged 
almost forty-five billion dollars in health care costs to their general-purpose 
credit cards.52 This amount is expected to rise to $150 billion by 2015.53 Al-
most fifty percent of families carried debt from out-of-pocket medical expens-
es in 2012, averaging $1678 per household.54 Medical debt, either charged to 
credit cards or owed directly to physicians or medical providers, is a signifi-
cant driver of personal bankruptcies.55 Sadly, those with medical debt are less 
likely to obtain necessary medical care due to the fear of falling deeper into 
                                                                                                                           
through Medicaid. How Will the Uninsured Fare Under the Affordable Care Act?, supra. More than 
sixty percent of America’s working poor live in states that have refused to expand Medicaid. Sabrina 
Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Millions of Poor Are Left Uncovered by Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
3, 2013, at A1. 
 44 See Whaley, supra note 23. A patient’s responsibility for health care costs under an insurance 
plan regulated by the ACA fluctuates depending on whether the person gets the plan through an em-
ployer or through the individual market, the employee’s income level, and the plan level chosen (for 
example, bronze, silver, or gold level plans). Jayne O’Donnell & Paul Overberg, Medical Debt Will 
Persist Despite Health Law, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 15, 2014, at B1. 
 45 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373, 1383 (2004). 
 46 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, TABLE 1188, at 740 
(2012). 
 47 Taub & Ruetschlin, supra note 34, at 13. 
 48 Id. at 6. 
 49 Id. at 9. 
 50 Id. at 6. 
 51 Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 15; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 52 Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 15; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 53 Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 15. 
 54 Taub & Ruetschlin, supra note 34, at 16. 
 55 David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a Na-
tional Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741 (2009). In 2007, illness or medical bills contributed to sixty-
two percent of all bankruptcies. Id. 
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debt.56 In 2012, half of all households with medical debt reported forgoing 
medical treatments and tests and filling prescriptions.57 
Health care providers have long been keenly aware of the financial diffi-
culties that patients face.58 Until recently, most health care providers attempted 
to assist their patients by routinely offering long-term payment plans for ex-
pensive treatments.59 These payment plans, administered by the doctor’s of-
fice, allowed patients to stretch out their payments over time, without incurring 
fees or interest.60 Yet these plans proved expensive for providers, who assumed 
the cost of administering the payment plans and associated billing and record-
keeping.61 Doctor-administered payment plans can cost medical practices at 
least three dollars per bill, and thus physicians often lose money attempting to 
recover what is owed.62 Hospitals who hire collection specialists to collect 
long overdue debts often only recover around ten cents on every dollar owed 
and end up paying the collection companies between thirty and forty percent of 
what is collected.63 In addition, providers are often reluctant to engage collec-
tion agencies to collect debts from patients because once they do so, the pro-
viders often lose these patients.64 Short of resorting to collections, however, 
providers find themselves without the means to collect what they are owed.65 
B. The Advent of Medical Credit Cards 
Patients’ need to finance their out-of-pocket health care costs and provid-
ers’ dissatisfaction with collecting debts from their patients created an oppor-
                                                                                                                           
 56 Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 239, 247 (2010); Taub & Ruetschlin, supra note 34, at 16. 
 57 Taub & Ruetschlin, supra note 34, at 16. 
 58 Pamela Lewis Dolan, Collecting the Patient Portion: Being Proactive, Early and Often, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Apr. 2, 2007, at 18, 19. A practice management professional noted that “[b]ecause a 
doctor can’t un-fix a patient, medical bills are often the last to get paid . . . .” Id. 
 59 Hawkins, supra note 18, at 847–50 (describing how many physicians extend credit to patients 
by allowing them to pay for treatments over an extended period of time); Dave Hansen, Giving Credit 
to Get What’s Due: How Doctors Can Help Patients Pay the Bill, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 21, 2008, at 
15, 15. As Hansen points out, “[w]ith more Americans uninsured or in high-deductible plans, experts 
say collecting the payment portion of bills is getting more important—and challenging—for physi-
cians’ practices. One solution many recommend to avoid the high cost and hassle of collection is set-
ting up payment plans for patients.” Id. 
 60 Hawkins, supra note 18, at 848. 
 61 Dolan, supra note 58, at 19; Pamela Moore, Billing and Collections: Playing Hardball, PHYSI-
CIANS PRACTICE, Apr. 1, 2008, at 57, 61. 
 62 Dolan, supra note 58, at 19. 
 63 Hansen, supra note 59, at 15; Grow & Berner, supra note 1. 
 64 Dolan, supra note 58, at 19. 
 65 See Dolan, supra note 58, at 19; Hansen, supra note 59, at 15–16; Moore, supra note 61, at 57 
(noting that “[a]s overdue patient accounts stack up, more physicians feel like they’re playing the 
patsy”). 
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tunity for a new kind of financing: deferred interest medical credit cards.66 Big 
names in the finance industry, including General Electric, Citibank, and Capi-
tal One, first offered medical credit cards in the early 2000s to help patients 
finance elective procedures such as cosmetic surgery.67 Those same companies 
saw that patients who were experiencing difficulty financing non-elective care 
were an untapped market.68 Accordingly, these creditors stepped in and began 
heavily marketing medical credit cards to providers and patients alike.69 Pro-
viders were quick to embrace this new service because doctors who offer a 
third-party medical credit card to their patients no longer bear the burden of 
providing a self-financed payment plan.70 
Signing up for a medical credit card is simple.71 When patients indicate 
that they will have difficulty paying for proposed medical treatments or ser-
vices, medical office staff can assist them with applying for a medical credit 
card right in the office.72 The application process often runs through the of-
fice’s own computer system and patients receive immediate approval, fre-
quently without a credit check.73 In just minutes, the health care provider bro-
kers a deal for the patient with a third-party creditor—usually without the pa-
tient communicating with anyone from the credit card company—and subse-
quently casts off all responsibility for collecting fees from the patient.74 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Hansen, supra note 59, at 16; Moore, supra note 61, at 59; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 
17; Whaley, supra note 23. 
 67 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Grow & Berner, supra note 1; Whaley, supra note 23. 
 68 See Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 14–15; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Grow & 
Berner, supra note 1. 
 69 See Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 15–16; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Grow & 
Berner, supra note 1. 
 70 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 865–66; Partridge & Barry, supra note 34, at 90; Moore, supra 
note 61, at 58 (citing consultant Judy Capko: “If a patient does owe you money, try to have him put 
his balance on a credit card or use a credit agency such as CareCredit that extends credit lines to pa-
tients. You get paid in full, and the patient can work out his troubles with someone else.”); Overdose 
of Debt, supra note 24, at 18 (noting that “31 state medical and veterinary associations and 11 national 
groups, including the American Dental Association, American College of Eye Surgeons, American 
Society of Plastic Surgeons, [and] American Society of Bariatric Physicians” endorse GE CareCredit); 
Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Grow & Berner, supra note 1. 
 71 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 860; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 808, 814; Silver-Greenberg, 
supra note 17; Dilworth, supra note 19. 
 72 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 860; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 808, 814; Silver-Greenberg, 
supra note 17. 
 73 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, supra note 19. 
 74 See Consent Order, supra note 30, at 4. Some patients apply for the cards outside of the health 
care provider’s office by enrolling through GE CareCredit’s website directly. Id.; Hawkins, supra note 
18, at 866; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 814; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
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Medical credit cards differ from general-purpose credit cards.75 Most may 
only be used at the medical provider’s office or hospital where services will be 
performed.76 In addition, most medical credit cards present patients with a 
choice of two payment plans: traditional fixed payment plans, where interest 
attaches if the balance is not paid in full, and deferred interest, or promotional, 
plans.77 Deferred interest plans offer a temporary no-interest promotional peri-
od, generally from six to eighteen months, during which patients can pay off 
their balances without incurring any interest or fees.78 If patients continue to 
carry a balance once the no-interest period ends, the credit card provider 
charges interest retroactively to the original day of the charge for the entire 
amount originally charged, even if a portion was already paid.79 The interest 
rates charged on deferred interest plans are often extremely high, ranging from 
twenty-five to thirty percent.80 In addition, patients are subject to late fees and 
penalties that often include an increase in the already high interest rates.81 
Generally, medical credit cards allow and encourage health care providers to 
charge patients for the entire projected cost of treatment upfront.82 Patients are 
therefore responsible for paying interest on the entire cost of their care, some-
times before the care is even administered or completed.83 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Risk Management Examination Manual of Credit Card Activities, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 
12–14 (Mar. 2007), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/credit_card/pdf_version/ch2.pdf 
(defining “general purpose” credit cards as ones that “can be used at a variety of stores and business-
es”). Medical credit cards are considered to be “proprietary cards.” Id. at 13–14. 
 76 See id. at 13. Medical credit cards are also known as “private label cards.” Id. Private label 
cards have lower credit limits and higher interest rates than general-purpose cards. Id. Also, private 
label cards are often made available to borrowers who pose a higher risk to creditors. Id. 
 77 See Consent Order, supra note 30, at 3; Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16; Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 78 See Consent Order, supra note 30, at 3; Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16; Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 79 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, supra note 19; Olen, supra note 22. 
 80 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, supra note 19; Olen, supra note 22. 
 81 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CARD ACT REPORT 32 (2013), http://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_card-act-report.pdf [hereinafter CARD ACT REPORT]. The prevailing 
interest rate for general-purpose credit cards in 2012 was 12.9%. Id.; see also Silver-Greenberg, supra 
note 17. 
 82 See Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16 (citing GE CareCredit brochure received by a New 
York area dentist urging him to “offer the plan so [he could] get immediate payment”); Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 17 (noting that medical credit card companies promote upfront payment in 
their marketing materials to medical providers). “[T]he transformation of medical bills into consumer 
debt means quicker cash for medical providers . . . .” Grow & Berner, supra note 1. 
 83 See Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16–17 (describing how a dentist encouraged a mother 
to apply for a medical credit card to pay for her daughter’s dental work; the work was subsequently 
cancelled but the dentist took months to refund the money to the mother); Silver-Greenberg, supra 
note 17 (describing how a dental clinic encouraged an elderly patient to apply for a medical credit 
card, charged the full amount of the patient’s dentures on the card, and never provided functional 
dentures to the patient); Grow & Berner, supra note 1 (describing how a dentist encouraged an elderly 
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Although medical credit card providers are eager to tap into the vast mar-
ket of patients who need financial assistance, they do not pay for market ac-
cess.84 Instead, health care providers pay credit card providers to offer the 
cards to their patients.85 While regular retail merchants pay a processing fee or 
a merchant discount rate of less than 2% of each charge, health care providers 
pay a great deal more, often over 13% per charge.86 Health care providers pay 
less, however, when they steer patients to arrangements that benefit the credi-
tor.87 For example, if a patient agreed to a no-interest, eighteen-month payment 
plan with a GE CareCredit card, a health care provider would pay a processing 
fee of 13.5%.88 If that same patient instead agreed to an extended-payment 
plan over two to five years with an annual interest rate of 11.9%, a more lucra-
tive plan for the creditor, the health care provider’s processing fee is reduced to 
5%.89 This arrangement encourages health care providers to promote self-
interested payment plans regardless of whether that plan is the most prudent 
choice for that particular patient.90 
Aside from the savings gained from shifting the financing, billing, and 
collection burden to medical credit card providers, health care providers reap 
additional tangible and intangible benefits from medical credit cards.91 The 
availability of easy financing makes patients more likely to agree to costly 
treatments that they would not otherwise be able to afford.92 Unlike health in-
surance or out-of-pocket payment, medical credit cards remit the entire charge 
to the health care provider within a day or two, even if the care or treatment 
has yet to be provided.93 Finally, the medical credit card companies provide 
                                                                                                                           
patient to apply for what she thought was an installment plan administered by the dentist’s office but 
was in fact a medical credit card, then charged the card for the full amount for dental implants despite 
the patient cancelling the remaining work). 
 84 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 864; Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16. 
 85 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 864; Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16. 
 86 See Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. Doctors can recruit more patients by paying medical lenders to provide credit to poten-
tial patients. Hawkins, supra note 18, at 865. 
 91 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 864–65; Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 15; Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 92 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 865 (noting that creditors appeal to doctors by emphasizing the 
increase in business that will result from offering medical credit cards and that doctors who offer the 
cards do report a substantial increase in sales); Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that one 
medical credit card provider, ChaseHealthAdvance, promotes its cards to medical providers by pro-
moting the cards’ tendency to influence patients to “book full comprehensive treatment plans”) (inter-
nal quotations omitted); Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17 (stating that medical providers are motivated 
to promote the medical credit cards because patients will then choose to undergo procedures and 
products that are not covered by insurance that they would otherwise forgo). 
 93 See Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 14; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
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sales and marketing training for medical office staff, promotional materials 
explaining the cards, and application software to the health care providers at no 
charge.94 
Aside from these financial benefits, health care providers often accrue 
goodwill from patients who are grateful for the availability of easy credit.95 
Although bills were formerly issued directly by the health care provider, medi-
cal credit card bills come from the financial institution.96 Patients interact with 
staff from the financial institution when they have billing questions.97 Medical 
office staff and, by extension, medical providers are no longer seen in the pa-
tient’s eyes as a bill collector to be avoided and loathed.98 Although the level 
of intangible benefit to the health care provider is difficult to quantify, medical 
credit cards certainly change the relationship between patient and provider.99 
C. Side Effects of Medical Credit Cards 
Although to health care providers medical credit cards seem like a win-
ning solution, the picture is not always as rosy from the patient’s perspec-
tive.100 Unlike a typical consumer situation, where a customer may open a 
credit card at a retail store, patients are often in pain, anxious, and in desperate 
need of health care when they apply for medical credit cards.101 Many of these 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 859; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 813–14. For example, Capital 
One trained fertility clinic staff to present loans in ways designed to increase patient interest. See 
Hawkins, supra note 18, at 859. In particular, staff were encouraged to present monthly payment 
amounts to patients rather than use larger, more daunting, figures. Id. 
 95 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 860; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, supra note 19. 
 96 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 866; Moore, supra note 61, at 58. 
 97 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 866; Moore, supra note 61, at 58. 
 98 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 854, 866. 
 99 See id. at 866; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 100 See Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 14, 16; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, 
supra note 19; Grow & Berner, supra note 1. 
 101 See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the 
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 650–53 (2007–2008) (quoting Raymond Tallis, 
Commentary: Leave Well Alone, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 1756, 1757 (1999)). Tallis described the vulnera-
ble state of many patients as follows: 
Someone who is ill and seeking help—unlike someone who is purchasing a pair of 
socks or a pound of sausages—is often vulnerable, certainly worried, sometimes un-
comfortable, and frequently frightened. [The term c]ustomer, like the other obvious 
choices—clients, consumers, and users—erases something that lies at the heart of med-
icine: compassion and a relationship of trust. 
Id.; see also Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 15; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, supra 
note 19; Grow & Berner, supra note 1. Credit card contracts may be considered to be adhesion con-
tracts in that they are “drafted unilaterally by a business enterprise and forced upon an unwilling and 
often unknowing public for services that cannot readily be obtained elsewhere.” Jones v. Dressel, 623 
P.2d 370, 374 (Colo. 1981). Contracts of adhesion often impose terms on a “take it or leave it” basis 
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patients are also elderly and less able to make complex financial decisions due 
to the effects of aging.102 Moreover, many Americans, regardless of age, have 
very little understanding of how credit works.103 In their vulnerable state, pa-
tients are even less likely than the average consumer to comprehend the terms 
of medical credit cards.104 Faced with the need to receive treatment, these pa-
tients are unlikely to shop around and consider other sources of financing.105 
Moreover, because medical office staff, whose primary expertise is not in cred-
it card services, explain the terms of medical credit cards, many patients walk 
away confused or ignorant about their newly assumed responsibility.106 It is 
telling that many patients who applied for medical credit cards reported that 
they did not even realize that they were applying for credit provided by a third-
party; instead they believed they were requesting a payment plan provided by 
the doctor’s office.107 
Aside from medical credit cards, consumers often make irrational credit 
choices.108 For example, consumers often carry balances on high-interest credit 
cards while keeping money in the bank earning minimal interest.109 As pa-
tients, consumers often replicate this irrational behavior.110 Patients are often 
unreasonably optimistic about their ability to repay their debts before the no-
interest period ends.111 As a result many patients decide to take out loans, dis-
regarding eventual interest rates because they do not believe they will continue 
to carry a balance past the no-interest period.112 
                                                                                                                           
and are often considered to be unfair. Id. Under certain circumstances, courts will refuse to enforce 
adhesion contracts for reasons of public policy. Id.; Fredric S. Newman, § 8.06[A] Characteristics of 
Contracts of Adhesion, in COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: STRATEGIES FOR DRAFTING AND NEGOTIAT-
ING 8-1 (Vladimir R. Rossman & Morton Moskin, eds., 2014). 
 102 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 103 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008) 
(citing Frequency Questionnaire, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ET AL. 8 (2006), http://cdn.american
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/kf/DEBT_SURVEY_FREQUENCY_QUESTIONNAIRE.PDF) 
(explaining that “[A] recent study by the Center for American Progress and the Center for Responsible 
Lending found that 38% of consumers believe that ‘[m]ost financial products such as mortgage loans 
and credit cards are too complicated and lengthy for [them] to fully understand.’”). 
 104 See Hall & Schneider, supra note 101, at 650; Hawkins, supra note 18, at 875–76; Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 105 See Hall & Schneider, supra note 101, at 652; Hawkins, supra note 18, at 876; Grow & 
Berner, supra note 1. 
 106 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 877–79; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 813–14; Silver-Greenberg, 
supra note 17; Grow & Berner, supra note 1. 
 107 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 877–78; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, supra 
note 19. 
 108 See Bar-Gill &Warren, supra note 103, at 21, 35. 
 109 See id. at 35. 
 110 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 875–76, 880. 
 111 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 103, at 34; Hawkins, supra note 18, at 880. 
 112 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 103, at 34; Hawkins, supra note 18, at 880. 
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Consumers’ inherent irrationality in making financial decisions is exacer-
bated by their innate trust in their medical providers.113 Unlike a consumer 
shopping for a car, a patient in a doctor’s office does not have his or her guard 
up against being taken advantage of financially.114 Patients form close attach-
ments to their physicians and are highly susceptible to any suggestions their 
office may make, financial or otherwise.115 Health care providers are not legal-
ly required to disclose to patients what their relationship is to the medical cred-
it card companies and how they stand to gain from patients selecting different 
types of payment plans.116 
According to their proponents, medical credit cards provide a way for pa-
tients to finance their care without paying interest or fees.117 Indeed, GE 
CareCredit reports that eighty percent of borrowers pay off their debts before 
they incur interest.118 Consumer advocates, however, have grown increasingly 
concerned that medical credit cards may trap patients into deferred interest 
payment plans for over-priced care at exorbitantly high interest rates that can 
imperil both their financial stability and credit scores.119 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE SUPPORTING MEDICAL CREDIT CARDS 
As medical credit cards proliferated in the marketplace, the existing fed-
eral laws governing consumer credit, namely the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 
and Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), proved in-
sufficient to regulate the new cards.120 In 2009, after the economic collapse, 
Congress passed the Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act (CARD 
Act).121 The CARD Act instituted a number of reforms of the credit card indus-
                                                                                                                           
 113 See Hall & Schneider, supra note 101, at 651–52; Hawkins, supra note 18, at 876; Horwitz, 
supra note 18, at 830–31; Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 114 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 875–76. 
 115 See Hall & Schneider, supra note 101, at 652–53; Hawkins, supra note 18, at 875. 
 116 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 886; Horowitz, supra note 18, at 823; Dilworth, supra note 19. 
 117 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 866; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17; Dilworth, supra note 
19. 
 118 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 17. 
 119 See Hawkins, supra note 18, at 877; Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 15; Silver-Greenberg, 
supra note 17 (quoting Ellen Cheek who provides legal aid to the elderly: “[T]his credit facilitates a 
bad financial decision that will haunt a patient because it adds to indebtedness . . . .”). Mark Rukavina, 
founder of healthcare consulting group Community Health Advisors, warns that if patients are “al-
ready financially squeezed . . . a high-interest card that promises an interest-free promotional period 
upfront could just delay the pain . . . and potentially create deeper problems down the road.” Dilworth, 
supra note 19. 
 120 Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r (2012); Federal Trade Commission 
Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 10. 
 121 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act), Pub. L. 
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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try.122 Following the CARD Act’s passage, in July 2010 Title X of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) created 
the CFPB.123 The CFPB has oversight over all federal consumer financial law; 
in 2013 the agency clamped down on the medical credit card industry’s largest 
provider, GE CareCredit.124 
A. Before the Financial Collapse: Credit Laws Allow for  
Growth of Medical Credit Cards 
The existing laws and regulations governing consumer credit cards are in-
sufficiently robust to police medical credit cards, especially as the cards con-
tinue to gain influence.125 When medical credit cards first emerged as an op-
tion for patients, a patchwork of existing federal laws and agencies oversaw 
the banking and credit industry.126 Two major controlling laws at the time were 
TILA and the FTC Act.127 These laws, however, did not curtail the medical 
credit card industry’s use of deferred interest rate plans.128 Both laws author-
ized various agencies, known as prudential regulators, to engage in consumer 
protection activities; however, this work was overshadowed by their more cen-
tral functions of protecting the “safety and soundness” of the banking indus-
try.129 
1. TILA Creates Disclosure Obligations for Credit Card Providers 
TILA, passed in 1968 as Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 
requires banks to disclose credit terms to make it easier for consumers to com-
pare offers and make informed choices about them.130 The Federal Reserve 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Id. 
 123 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5301–5641 (2012). The CFPB was first proposed by Elizabeth Warren in a widely publicized arti-
cle in which she called for the creation of the Financial Product Safety Commission modeled after the 
United States Consumer Product Safety Commission. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DE-
MOCRACY J. 8, 16 (2007). 
 124 Dodd-Frank § 5511; see Consent Order, supra note 30. 
 125 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 103, at 4, 6, 84–90, 95, 97. 
 126 See id. at 4, 84, 97. The federal and state laws that govern credit products have been described 
as a “tattered patchwork . . . that have failed to adapt to changing markets.” Id. at 4. 
 127 Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r (2012); Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 10. 
 128 See CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 10; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 103, at 97. 
 129 See CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 10, 95 (noting that prudential regulators, including 
the Federal Reserve Board, have the primary responsibility for monitoring the safety and soundness of 
financial institutions); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 103, at 90. 
 130 Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968); Dilworth, supra note 
19. 
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Board implemented TILA through the promulgation of Regulation Z, which 
detailed banks’ and other creditors’ required disclosures.131 
TILA disclosure rules were intended to reduce the information deficit that 
regulators believed was hindering consumers from making wise credit choic-
es.132 Regulators hoped that by requiring that credit card providers give con-
sumers more information with credit card offers, the providers would be moti-
vated to compete for consumers’ business by improving the terms of credit 
offers.133 While TILA disclosure regulations arguably are successful in requir-
ing credit card providers to disclose their terms, in the case of medical credit 
cards, consumers and patients often do not make use of the information to in-
form their choices.134 Because patients are unlikely to compare credit offers in 
a rational manner at their time of need, medical credit card issuers are not 
prompted by competitive forces to offer terms more advantageous to pa-
tients.135 
Even if the disclosure of information had the desired effect of encourag-
ing consumers to compare credit offers, the potential positive impact has been 
muffled by the fact that medical office staff members, not financial profession-
als, explain the terms of the medical credit cards to patients.136 Although fi-
nancial institutions are required to abide by TILA disclosure requirements, of-
                                                                                                                           
 131 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2014). The Federal Reserve Board is the central bank of the United States. 
See id. Regulation Z requires lenders to present information about the terms and costs of credit in 
tabular form including annual percentage rates, penalty rates, and finance charges. Id. § 226.5. 
 132 See TILA 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012). The statute’s Findings and Declaration of Purpose 
states: 
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition 
among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of 
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use 
of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of 
this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be 
able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the un-
informed use of credit . . . . 
Id. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See Barr-Gill & Warren, supra note 103, at 9, 12, 13, 35 (noting that “[c]onsumers do not seek 
to acquire more information because they are not aware that they need more information or that more 
information is available for them to acquire”); Hawkins, supra note 18, at 875–76 (stating that “[t]he 
vulnerable state of patients, combined with their trust in their doctors, means that many patients tend 
to follow physicians’ recommendations without critical thought”). 
 135 See Hall & Schneider, supra note 101, at 652–53. “Doctors’ ‘monopoly’ power is intensified 
by patients’ almost irredeemable ignorance about almost all of almost every transaction.” Id.; see also 
Hawkins, supra note 18, at 844 (describing how patients take their doctors’ financing recommenda-
tions without doing their own outside research or “shop[ping] around”). 
 136 Hawkins, supra note 18, at 877; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 813–14; Silver-Greenberg, supra 
note 17. 
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fice staff are under no such compulsion.137 Moreover, staff represent the health 
care provider, who has incentives to enroll patients in these cards, regardless of 
what may be the best option for that patient.138 
2. Section Five of the FTC Act Attempts to Protect Consumers 
In addition to TILA, Section Five of the FTC Act also affects the credit 
card industry.139 Section Five prohibits covered entities from engaging in “un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices.”140 The FTC Act, however, does not consid-
er depository institutions, including banks, to be a covered entity.141 If the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) determines that a bank engaged in unfair and 
deceptive practices with regard to its credit card products, its only remedy is to 
request that the Federal Reserve take action.142 Therefore, because banks that 
are not subject to direct FTC control issue the vast majority of medical credit 
cards, the FTC Act is an ineffective regulator of most medical credit card pro-
viders.143 
B. Financial Collapse Leads to Legal Reforms and the Birth of the CFPB 
When the mortgage industry in the United States collapsed in 2008, Con-
gress turned its attention to the consumer credit card market and its role in the 
financial crisis.144 In 2009, Congress passed the CARD Act.145 The stated pur-
pose of the CARD Act was to “establish fair and transparent practices related 
to the extension of credit . . . .”146 To do so it imposed a host of restrictions on 
credit card providers by amending TILA.147 Under the CARD Act, credit card 
companies are no longer allowed to issue credit to consumers without consid-
ering the person’s ability to pay their minimum monthly payments.148 Addi-
tionally, amounts and types of fees, including penalty fees, are severely re-
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r (2012); Hawkins, supra note 18, 
at 843, 885–86. 
 138 See Overdose of Debt, supra note 24, at 16. 
 139 Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see CARD ACT REPORT, 
supra note 81, at 10. 
 140 FTC Act § 45. 
 141 Id. § 45(a)(2). 
 142 See Barr-Gill & Warren, supra note 103, at 88, 95. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 7 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 34 (2012). 
 145 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act), Pub. L. 
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 146 Id. 
 147 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2014); see CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 11. 
 148 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act), 15 
U.S.C. §1665e (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.51; see CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 11–12. 
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stricted and in some cases eliminated altogether.149 The Act also tamps down 
on credit card providers’ ability to increase interest rates on existing balanc-
es.150 
Initially, responsibility for the administration of the CARD Act was as-
signed to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.151 Yet after 
the creation of the CFPB through Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, the admin-
istration of the CARD Act eventually became the responsibility of the 
CFPB.152 One of the CFPB’s first actions was to amend TILA’s Regulation Z, 
originally requiring disclosures by credit card companies, in order to comply 
with the new rules set out in the CARD Act.153 
The creation of the CFPB marked the first time that a single agency was 
granted the power to regulate the entire consumer financial products and ser-
vices sector.154 The stated purpose of the CFPB is to “seek to implement and, 
where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the 
purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer 
financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial prod-
ucts and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”155 The CFPB’s mis-
sion differs from that of the other regulatory agencies that are charged with 
bolstering the banking industry in that the CFPB is empowered to engage in 
rulemaking and issue orders and guidance to implement “Federal consumer 
financial law.”156 Additionally, the CFPB monitors the consumer financial 
                                                                                                                           
 149 CARD Act §§ 1637(k), 1637(n), 1665(d); CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 11–12. 
 150 CARD Act §§ 1637(i)(1), 1666i-1, 1666i-2(a); CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 11. 
 151 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act), Pub. L. 
111-24, § 2, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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 153 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2014); see CARD ACT REPORT, supra note 81, at 11. 
 154 Dodd-Frank § 5491; see Block-Lieb, supra note 144, at 29, 31; Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in 
Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 409–10 
(2013); Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General After Dodd-
Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 125–26 (2013). The CFPB’s scope of oversight is evolving; its current 
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nondepository financial institutions: providers of private student loans, payday loans, and mortgage-
related services. Dodd-Frank §§ 5581–5587, 5514–5515. In addition to these three categories of non-
depository institutions, the CFPB can also assert regulatory power over any nondepository institution 
it considers to be a “larger participant of a [consumer financial] market” as well as any entity it sus-
pects is engaging in activity that poses risks to consumers. Id. § 5514. Depository institutions with ten 
billion dollars or less in assets are subject to certain CFPB rules but are not subject to CFPB supervi-
sion or enforcement. Id. § 5516. 
 155 Dodd-Frank § 5511(a). 
 156 Id. § 5511; see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 103, at 90. 
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product market and providers for compliance with the law.157 It also conducts 
financial education programs and collects, investigates, and responds to con-
sumer complaints.158 
The CFPB’s oversight extends to at least nineteen federal laws, known as 
the “enumerated consumer laws,” including TILA.159 In addition to enforcing 
these federal laws, the CFPB also enforces the various implementing regula-
tions of the federal laws.160 
Title X, in addition to creating the CFPB, prohibits acts relating to con-
sumer financial products and services that are unfair, deceptive, or abusive; 
violations may result in civil monetary penalties and criminal prosecution.161 
The CFPB is charged with enforcing these prohibitions.162 Under Title X an act 
or practice is unfair if it “(A) . . . causes or is likely to cause substantial injury 
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and (B) such 
substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
to competition.”163 An act or practice is abusive if it prevents a consumer from 
understanding the terms and conditions of a financial product or exploits the 
consumer’s ignorance.164 Finally, a representation, omission, act, or practice is 
deceptive if it: (1) misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) the con-
sumer’s interpretation of it is reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) is 
material.165 
The CFPB has a variety of tools at its disposal to enforce the law and pro-
tect consumers.166 The CFPB may engage in rulemaking by promulgating 
                                                                                                                           
 157 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5511 (2012). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. § 5481(12). 
 160 Id.; Supervision and Examination Manual, Version 2, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU Over-
view 1 (Oct. 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-
manual-v2.pdf. 
 161 Dodd-Frank §§ 5536, 5565, 5566. 
 162 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12 U.S.C. 
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 165 Supervision and Examination Manual, supra note 160, at Procedures 9. 
 166 Dodd-Frank §§ 5512, 5562. 
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rules, issuing orders, and providing guidance on federal consumer financial 
laws.167 It conducts investigations of covered entities and has broad power to 
demand information from them, whether via direct testimony, written respons-
es, or production of documents.168 It also holds hearings and adjudication pro-
ceedings, including cease-and-desist proceedings.169 The CFPB has the author-
ity to initiate civil actions against covered entities and seek relief, including 
rescission or reformation of contracts, monetary refunds, or return of real 
property, restitution, disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment, and 
damages.170 If the CFPB discovers that a covered entity has violated federal 
criminal law, it will forward the evidence to the U.S. Attorney General.171 
In addition to the tools described above, the CFPB has devoted an un-
precedented amount of resources to its outreach to and interaction with the 
public.172 The CFPB’s enabling statute directs it to set up both a toll-free tele-
phone number and a website for consumers to directly lodge complaints about 
consumer financial products or services.173 Since the CFPB began accepting 
complaints regarding credit cards on July 21, 2011, through July 2014, it has 
received and responded to over fifty-three thousand credit card complaints.174 
Members of the public are able to view an updated spreadsheet of complaints 
and their resolution status on the CFPB website; the Bureau also prepares peri-
odic public reports outlining the complaints it receives.175 
The CFPB, however, has progressed far beyond simply receiving com-
plaints from the public.176 It has reached out to consumers through social me-
dia, including Facebook and Twitter, to solicit complaints and narratives about 
consumer experiences with financial products and services and to encourage 
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the public to participate in the formal rulemaking process.177 The CFPB has 
even held public events to publicize its desire for comments.178 
C. The CFPB Cracks Down on GE CareCredit 
In 2013, after receiving hundreds of complaints from consumers, the 
CFPB used its powers of enforcement to punish the largest provider of medical 
credit cards for deceptive practices.179 On December 10, 2013, the CFPB an-
nounced that it was ordering GE Capital Retail Bank and its subsidiary, 
CareCredit, to refund just over thirty-four million dollars to more than one mil-
lion customers who were victims of deceptive credit card enrollment tactics.180 
After investigation, the CFPB found that GE CareCredit customers were mis-
led during the enrollment process into believing that the cards were interest-
free.181 GE CareCredit was reprimanded for its failure to properly train and 
monitor the medical office staff that assisted patients with their GE CareCredit 
applications and the company was ordered to improve its practices.182 
Before the enforcement action, GE CareCredit offered both traditional 
fixed payment option plans and deferred interest, or promotional, plans to pa-
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tients.183 The fixed payment option charged a 14.9% annual percentage rate 
(APR) to customers who were required to make monthly payments until the 
balance was paid in full.184 The deferred interest option, which was selected by 
85% of patients, charged a 26.99% APR on the consumer’s declining balance 
from the date of the consumer’s original purchase if the consumer did not pay 
off the balance in full within a certain set period of time, ranging from six to 
twenty-four months.185 
Through its investigation of GE CareCredit, the CFPB discovered that the 
company failed to sufficiently train and monitor health care providers’ staff 
members so that the information they provided to patients was accurate.186 GE 
CareCredit therefore engaged in deceptive and unfair practices in violation of 
sections 5531 and 5536 of the Dodd-Frank Act.187 As a result, patients re-
ceived incorrect information from health care providers’ staff members, which 
led them to incur interest charges they did not expect.188 In some cases, the 
deferred interest option was explained to indicate that the credit would be “in-
terest free for twelve months” rather than subject to deferred interest.189 Staff 
also failed to provide written disclosures as required by Regulation Z of TILA 
and neglected to tell patients that they would be subject to 26.99% interest at 
the end of the promotional period.190 Even if staff provided accurate written 
disclosures to patients, they often contradicted the written information orally 
so that patients did not understand the terms.191 
The CFPB ordered GE CareCredit to comply with a variety of discipli-
nary measures through a Consent Order.192 GE CareCredit was directed to pay 
thirty-four million dollars to more than 1.2 million aggrieved consumers in 
addition to agreeing to cease and desist its unfair and deceptive practices.193 
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Additionally, the CFPB required GE CareCredit to create a Remedial Monitor-
ing Plan to prevent further violations.194 The Remedial Monitoring Plan com-
pelled GE CareCredit to modify its contracts with health care providers in a 
way that requires providers to accurately describe the terms of the cards to pa-
tients.195 To that end, the CFPB instructed GE CareCredit to improve the train-
ing and marketing materials it supplies to providers.196 
The Remedial Monitoring Plan also required GE CareCredit to change its 
contracts with health care providers to prohibit them from placing upfront 
charges for medical services not yet rendered on the cards unless the charges 
are for orthodontia, for custom products, or will be completed within thirty 
days.197 Patients of dental and audiology practices who wish to charge more 
than one thousand dollars on the card must apply directly to GE CareCredit, 
rather than doing so in the provider’s office.198 GE CareCredit will inform 
those dental and audiology patients, through a written script approved by the 
CFPB, about the terms and conditions of the financing plan.199 If a provider 
does not follow the terms of the Consent Order, a patient has the right to a re-
fund of all dental or audiology charges made to his or her account, even if ser-
vices were already rendered.200 
Moreover, the Remedial Monitoring Plan requires GE CareCredit to make 
its best efforts to call patients within forty-eight hours of applying for credit 
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through a health care provider’s office.201 Through this “Welcome Call,” GE 
CareCredit employees will, again through a written script approved by the 
CFPB, inform patients about the amount of the initial charges made to the ac-
count, notify them that the health care must be completed within thirty days, 
and explain the deferred interest option.202 Two months before the end of an 
individual’s promotional period, GE CareCredit must notify individuals 
through paper bills or emails that their promotional period is due to end.203 
Finally, as part of the Consent Order, GE CareCredit is prohibited from 
giving kickbacks, rebates, compensation, or in-kind services to any health care 
provider in exchange for that provider’s loan volume.204 GE CareCredit also 
assumes the responsibility of closely monitoring health care providers who fail 
to properly administer the program and may ultimately terminate the providers 
from offering the cards to their patients.205 GE CareCredit must also improve 
its consumer complaint and dispute system.206 
The Consent Order, though wide-ranging, did not require GE CareCredit 
to stop offering deferred interest credit cards to patients.207 As a result, GE 
CareCredit and other medical credit card providers may continue to advance 
deferred interest credit cards to patients as a way to finance health care 
costs.208 
III. MEDICAL CREDIT CARDS: A PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 
To advance its mission of protecting vulnerable consumers, the CFPB 
must take action to further regulate the medical credit card industry.209 The 
CFPB should expand upon its 2013 enforcement action against GE CareCredit 
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and engage in rulemaking to ban deferred interest medical credit cards.210 
Short of an outright ban, the CFPB should impose the reforms contained in its 
GE CareCredit Consent Order on the entire medical credit card industry 
through rulemaking.211 Similarly, the CFPB should use rulemaking to revise 
the Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act (CARD Act) regulations to 
help consumers understand how to avoid paying deferred interest.212 Lastly, 
the CFPB should also build upon its congressional mandate to educate the pub-
lic about consumer financial issues by educating the health care providers who 
offer medical credit cards about their terms and conditions.213 
A. Banning Deferred Interest Medical Credit Cards 
The CARD Act directed the CFPB to prepare a report every two years 
about the consumer credit market.214 In its first report, issued in October 2013, 
the CFPB identified deferred interest credit cards as requiring further study and 
assessment.215 According to the CFPB, forty-three percent of consumers with 
low credit scores end up paying a lump sum of retroactive interest on deferred 
interest cards.216 Even though the majority of borrowers with low credit scores 
escape paying retroactive interest, the CFPB reported that deferred interest 
products pose risks to potentially vulnerable consumers, which led the Bureau 
to identify deferred interest cards as an area of continuing concern and moni-
toring.217 
Deferred interest medical credit cards confuse patients, impose large fi-
nancial burdens, and can be used deceptively.218 The best way to prevent these 
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problems is for the CFPB to ban deferred interest medical credit cards.219 In-
stead of offering financing with deferred interest, medical credit cards should 
offer financing with terms equivalent to those attached to general-purpose 
credit cards.220 General-purpose credit cards are better for patients because 
many are able to offer truly interest-free financing for set periods of time.221 
The terms of deferred interest medical credit cards are dangerous for pa-
tients.222 The cards carry with them extremely high interest rates, and if the 
patient does not pay off the balance during the promotional period, those rates 
are applied retroactively to the patient’s entire balance.223 If a patient pays off 
the balance just one month after the promotional period ends, the balance can 
increase to twenty-seven times more than the original cost.224 Borrowers with 
low credit scores are harmed disproportionately by deferred interest medical 
credit cards.225 In 2010, less than sixty percent of borrowers with low credit 
scores avoided paying deferred interest by paying off their balance before the 
end of the promotional period.226 In contrast, eighty-eight percent of borrowers 
with high credit scores paid off their balances in time.227 
General-purpose credit cards are a safer alternative for patients.228 Gen-
eral-purpose credit cards may offer teaser or introductory rates as low as zero 
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percent.229 If the borrower does not pay off the balance by the end of the pro-
motional period, interest is charged only on the remaining balance from the 
end of the promotional period going forward, not applied retroactively.230 In-
terest rates on general-purpose credit cards are more modest than the rates 
charged by deferred interest credit cards and therefore place a smaller financial 
burden on patients.231 
A counterargument to banning deferred interest medical credit cards—
thereby potentially reducing credit card providers’ profit—is that a ban will 
lessen the amount of credit available to high-risk borrowers who would other-
wise be unable to obtain financing for necessary medical treatment.232 Similar 
arguments were made in the wake of the CARD Act’s passage, but critics’ 
fears did not come to pass.233 The CARD Act’s provisions, which went into 
effect in 2010, limited the extension of credit to only those who could show an 
ability to repay their debts.234 After new account approval rates dropped sharp-
ly between 2007 and 2009 due to the financial crisis, by 2012 new account 
approval rates were back up to seventy-four percent of the rate of approvals in 
2007 for borrowers with low credit scores.235 Despite fears that credit market 
reforms would squeeze out high-risk borrowers, the consumer credit market 
has continued to provide opportunities for those borrowers to obtain credit.236 
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Similarly, a ban on deferred interest medical credit cards would likely not pre-
vent patients from accessing credit through general-purpose credit cards.237 
B. The CFPB Should Utilize Rulemaking to Ban or Restrict Deferred 
Interest Medical Credit Cards 
Unless specified by statute, administrative agencies may act through 
rulemaking, adjudication, or by issuing advisory guidance to the entities they 
regulate.238 To date, the CFPB has favored the use of adjudication rather than 
rulemaking in relation to deferred interest medical credit cards.239 After 
amending Regulation Z’s disclosure rules through rulemaking to conform to 
the CARD Act, the CFPB refrained from engaging in further rulemaking that 
directly targeted deferred interest medical credit cards.240 Instead, the Agency 
chose to use its power of adjudication in an enforcement action against GE 
CareCredit.241 The resulting Consent Order was wide-ranging and made a sig-
nificant financial impact on GE CareCredit, requiring the company to change 
many of its deceptive practices and to pay a hefty sum in restitution.242 
Rather than focusing on restraining one medical credit card provider at a 
time through adjudication, the CFPB should use rulemaking to ban deferred 
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interest medical credit cards.243 If the CFPB decides instead to allow the use of 
deferred interest medical credit cards, it should use rulemaking to expand to 
the entire medical credit card industry the restrictions imposed on GE 
CareCredit through the Consent Order.244 
1. Reasons Why the CFPB May Favor Adjudication over Rulemaking 
Adjudication is considered to be the best choice when an agency needs to 
act quickly to deal with a threat to the public because adjudication does not 
require a lengthy notice and comment period. 245 The desire for such swift ac-
tion may have prompted the CFPB to choose to adjudicate against GE 
CareCredit rather than engage in the more lengthy and involved rulemaking 
process.246 Sometimes agencies choose adjudication when there is a lack of 
agreement in the industry or public at large about what the correct approach 
should be to a problem, or if the area seems to be in flux.247 In the case of de-
ferred interest medical credit cards, the CFPB may be reluctant to use its rule-
making powers to ban or severely limit the cards because deferred interest 
credit cards are so prevalent throughout the retail sector.248 Agencies also must 
be stewards of their scarce resources; adjudication is seen as less costly than 
rulemaking and the CFPB could be marshaling its resources for other initia-
tives.249 
Moreover, the CFPB’s rulemaking power is subject to several constraints 
that may push it towards adjudication over rulemaking.250 The Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (RFA) requires agencies, including the CFPB, to follow certain 
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procedures to limit the cost of their rules to small business entities.251 Agencies 
must perform both an initial and final regulatory flexibility analysis of any 
rulemaking that describes the impact the rule will have on small entities.252 If 
the rule will have a significant impact on small entities, they must be allowed 
to participate in the rulemaking process.253 
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA) amended the RFA and imposes additional rulemaking requirements 
on certain agencies including the CFPB.254 Before the CFPB publishes a pro-
posed rule, it must detail the rule’s potential impact on small entities to the 
Small Business Administration (SBA).255 The SBA then convenes a review 
panel and may take up to sixty days to report its concerns to the CFPB.256 The 
CFPB must then modify its proposed rule if necessary.257 Following the 
SBREFA panel process, the CFPB may publish its proposed rule.258 
The panel process creates rulemaking transaction costs and delays rule-
making.259 In general, rulemaking for a federal agency takes an average of 
eighteen months.260 The SBREFA process may add an additional two months 
to CFPB’s rulemaking timeline.261 As a result, the CFPB may choose to avoid 
rulemaking when it can and instead pursue its aims through adjudication, 
which is not subject to this burdensome process.262 In the alternative, the 
CFPB may choose to propose incremental, rather than broad, rules to avoid 
fending off challenges from small entities.263 
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In addition to the requirements of the SBREFA, the CFPB must also per-
form a cost-benefit analysis whenever it undertakes rulemaking.264 The CFPB 
is required by its own statute to consider whether the rule would reduce access 
to consumer financial products or services, or have a negative impact on small 
depositaries and rural consumers.265 The CFPB is not required to perform this 
cost-benefit analysis on its adjudications, enforcement decisions, or settle-
ments, thereby potentially encouraging the CFPB to shy away from rulemak-
ing towards adjudication.266 
The CFPB’s rulemaking power is also constrained by its statutory require-
ment to consult with prudential regulators and other federal agencies before 
proposing rules.267 This consultation requirement, coupled with the ability of 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council to veto the CFPB’s rulemaking, may 
result in the CFPB favoring adjudication over rulemaking.268 
2. CFPB Adjudication Is Insufficient to Remedy Issues Within the Medical 
Credit Card Industry 
The CFPB’s choice to adjudicate against GE CareCredit rather than use 
rulemaking to either ban deferred interest medical credit cards or reform the 
entire medical credit card industry is an incomplete response to a continuing 
problem.269 Adjudication has a limited reach; for example, GE CareCredit is 
the only deferred interest medical credit card provider that is bound by the 
terms of its Consent Order.270 As a result, the GE CareCredit Consent Order 
did not create clear guidelines to direct the other deferred interest medical 
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credit card providers.271 In the absence of rules incorporating the terms of the 
Consent Order that would apply to all providers, the CFPB can only bring 
about change by monitoring the other providers and initiate enforcement ac-
tions against them.272 
It would be more efficient and effective for the CFPB to promulgate rules 
that would either ban deferred interest medical credit cards or reform the entire 
medical credit card industry.273 In addition to rulemaking being more efficient 
and effective because it impacts all similarly situated entities equally, there are 
other reasons rulemaking is the right next step for the CFPB.274 The APA re-
quirement that the agency give notice of its intention to engage in rulemaking 
and solicit comments from the public would ensure that the agency considers 
information from multiple relevant sources.275 In addition, the process of re-
ceiving and vetting comments from many different informed sources and in-
dustry participants is more conducive to policymaking than the trial-like pro-
ceedings connected to adjudication.276 
The CFPB’s use of rulemaking would also be fairer to the medical credit 
card industry.277 First, as previously described, only GE CareCredit is bound 
by the terms of the Consent Order, potentially rendering it at a disadvantage to 
competitors.278 Second, clear rules would allow regulated entities to engage in 
advanced planning to ensure ongoing compliance.279 In contrast, continued 
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CFPB adjudication may result in the promulgation of ad hoc, disjointed direc-
tives.280 For reasons of efficiency, competitive fairness, and effectiveness, the 
CFPB should use its rulemaking powers to either ban or strictly regulate de-
ferred interest medical credit cards.281 
3. Imposing GE CareCredit’s Consent Order on the Entire Industry and 
Improving the CARD Act 
Short of an outright ban on deferred interest medical credit cards, the 
CFPB should impose the terms of the GE CareCredit Consent Order on the 
entire medical credit card industry.282 In addition, it should engage in rulemak-
ing to expand its current CARD Act regulations to protect patients.283 The 
CARD Act currently requires that payments made in the last two months of a 
deferred interest promotional period be allocated to the promotional balance.284 
In addition, the CARD Act sets the minimum promotional period for deferred 
interest rates at six months.285 CFPB rules call for credit card providers to dis-
close the length of the promotional period clearly and conspicuously.286 Credi-
tors may only use the term “no interest” to describe a deferred interest product 
if they also include a “if paid in full” caveat in a clear and conspicuous man-
ner.287 Additionally, on the front of each statement to patients, creditors must 
put the date by which the borrower must pay off the balance in full to avoid 
paying interest.288 
The CFPB should make further improvements to the CARD Act regula-
tions to reduce the chances that borrowers pay unexpected amounts of inter-
est.289 The current language that must be included on deferred interest credit 
card statements should be expanded to more clearly explain to borrowers how 
to avoid paying interest.290 In addition, current CARD Act regulations that re-
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quire creditors to evaluate only the ability of the borrower to make minimum 
payments at the time the credit is issued are inadequate.291 Creditors should be 
required to assess not just the borrower’s ability to make minimum payments 
but also the borrower’s ability to pay off the entire balance during the deferred 
interest period.292 
C. The CFPB Should Educate Health Care Providers About the Potential 
Perils of Deferred Interest Medical Credit Cards 
When physicians take the Hippocratic Oath, they agree to “keep [patients] 
from harm and injustice.”293 To that end, physicians and other medical provid-
ers must learn about the financial products that they offer to their patients and 
refrain from offering harmful products.294 Part of the CFPB’s mission is to 
conduct consumer education programs.295 Given that physicians and medical 
providers are the initial consumers of deferred interest medical credit cards, the 
CFPB should reach out to medical and other professional associations and 
partner with them to educate physicians about the terms and conditions of the 
products they are offering to patients.296 Ideally, if physicians and medical 
providers learn about the deleterious impact that these medical credit cards can 
have on patients, they will cease to offer the cards to their patients, or they will 
press credit companies to provide general-purpose credit cards with fair terms 
to patients instead.297 If physicians and medical providers continue to offer the 
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deferred interest cards, at least they will be able to speak knowledgeably to 
their patients about how they function.298 
CONCLUSION 
Deferred interest medical credit cards are deceptive and dangerous, and 
should be banned. When sick and vulnerable patients seek relief from medical 
providers, credit card companies seeking to profit at their expense should not, 
in turn, prey on them. Deferred interest medical credit cards lead all too often 
to patients being responsible for retroactive interest at extremely high rates. 
Absent a blanket ban, medical credit cards should have terms and conditions 
equivalent to general-purpose credit cards where any interest charged is based 
on the balance that remains at the end of a promotional period, rather than on 
the entire amount originally charged to the card. If medical credit cards were 
structured like general-purpose credit cards, they could offer the benefit of a 
promotional period that is truly interest-free and would not needlessly confuse 
fragile patients. 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) should build on its 
2013 enforcement action against GE CareCredit and engage in rulemaking to 
completely ban deferred interest medical credit cards. Short of an outright ban, 
the CFPB ought to use rulemaking to impose the reforms in its GE CareCredit 
Consent Order on the entire medical credit card industry. In addition, the 
CFPB should use rulemaking to revise Credit Card Accountability and Disclo-
sure Act (CARD Act) regulations to require that creditors ensure that patients 
understand the terms of the deferred interest cards and how to avoid paying 
interest. This would advance the CFPB’s mandate of consumer protection. 
Lastly, the CFPB should fulfill its mission by offering education for medical 
providers so that providers understand how the financial products they offer to 
their patients may ultimately harm the very patients they are trying to help. 
Medical providers must also take responsibility for the way that financing is 
presented to patients by their office staff and make sure that no high-pressure 
and deceptive tactics are used. 
When Alice Diltz was confronted with an expensive but necessary dental 
procedure, she trusted the medical staff that cared for her to provide her with a 
reasonable way to finance the procedure. Her struggle to repay thousands of dol-
lars for a procedure that was not even completed could have been avoided by the 
CFPB’s implementation of consumer-focused reforms to the medical credit card 
industry. It is imperative that these changes occur, so that patients who need care 
do not sacrifice their financial well-being while pursuing their physical well-being. 
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